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In this issue...
The Bank of Canada has announced that its inflation-targeting regime,
in place since 1991, is at last to get a thorough review. The issues need-
ing examination include whether to move to a “price stability” program,
which might be both feasible and desirable. 
Better Late Than
Never:
Towards a Systematic Review of
Canada’s Monetary Policy Regime
Monetary Policy  The Study in Brief
When Canada adopted a 2 per cent inflation target in 1991, it did so in anticipation that, after further study,
there would be a move to “price stability” beyond 1995. While inflation targeting has created a low-
inflation environment, with good effects for Canada’s economy, price stability has slipped from the agenda.
The objective was postponed in 1993, and it subsequently disappeared altogether. The Bank of Canada,
however, in 2006 made a new promise to study all aspects of inflation targeting, as a prelude to possible
reform of the current program at renewal time in 2011. Research must cover technical matters, but it should
also re-open the price stability question. Switching to this goal would require careful preparation, so it
needs early study.
Price stability would have two key features. Instead of the current 2 percent, 1 percent CPI inflation
would be the likely target, and, instead of treating inflation performance, when it overshoots or
undershoots the target, as a bygone in deciding on future policy, policymakers would aim to correct its
effects on the price level’s path. Such a regime should lead to better economic decision making at longer
time horizons. But its potential for bringing about productivity gains is likely to be small, because
significant productivity effects of the monetary stability experienced since the early 1990s have been hard
to identify. And though goods and labour markets are now more flexible, achieving those gains might still
involve noticeable transition costs.
However, distributional considerations — who loses and who gains from inflation — could tip the
balance in favour of a stable price-level goal. Inflation, even at 2 percent, has corrosive effects on savings
and fixed money incomes. It reduces the purchasing power of a dollar to less than 80 cents in a decade. As
the population ages, and the ranks of the retired swell, this corrosive effect on savings will affect more
people, and might encourage political support for price stability. International considerations could play a
supportive role as well. Inflation abroad is lower now than in 1991, and the US, too, might adopt inflation
targets. These factors have implications for Canada’s exchange rate, and though this matter is more
political than economic, it nevertheless requires careful thought.
This  Commentary identifies the main policy issues that need early and thorough examination,
including: whether the achievement and maintenance of price stability would bring gains in economic
efficiency relative to the status quo; whether moving to it would entail significant costs; and whether there
is any prospect of political support for monetary change. At present, the right choice for 2011 remains
unclear, but systematic research undertaken well before then will ensure that, after 20 years, Canada's
monetary policy regime will at last be the outcome of a carefully considered choice.
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anada’s macroeconomic situation has not looked better since the mid-
1960s, but this very fact should prompt a little reflection. Low inflation
and economic stability seemed to be well established then as well, but
soon after, they began to come apart, and a full quarter-century passed
before they were restored. What happened once can happen again, because
satisfactory macroeconomic performance, if it is to be sustained, requires the
support of a coherent monetary order. Just because Canada’s current inflation-
control program has coped well with the stresses of the recent past does not mean
that it is proof against those that it has yet to encounter, or that it reflects the
current state of the art in such arrangements. Even, or perhaps particularly, in
what seem to be good times, a little attention to these matters can go a long way
towards enhancing the chances that those times will persist.
The Importance of Public Support for Monetary Stability 
William Robson (2007) recounts how Canada’s post-war monetary order, while
always fragile, collapsed in the 1970s and 80s. He suggests that much of the credit
for the country’s improved economic performance over the last 15 years or so
should go to the restoration of coherence in monetary policy since the early 1990s.
Specifically, he reminds his readers that a 2 percent inflation target, agreed on by
the Bank of Canada and successive ministers of finance, has been pursued by the
Bank without further political interference, and has also been supported by
responsible fiscal policy. He argues that this policy regime has provided a
foundation for steady employment growth; reasonably peaceful labour relations; a
slow expansion of incomes that has nevertheless modestly outpaced increases in
the cost of living; as well as predictable and manageable interest rates on
mortgages and consumer loans. Only a large exchange rate swing has given any
cause for concern.
The Dangers of Success
Monetary policy in Canada is nevertheless not a solved problem, because a few
warning signs have appeared recently that public understanding and support for
the current monetary order might be dissipating. Last year’s renewal of the
inflation-control program until 2011, for example, attracted little attention. Of
course, the very fact that the population at large no longer worries continually
about inflation as it conducts its day-by-day business is a sign of inflation
targeting’s success, but such success has its dangers. Policy proposals capable of
undermining monetary stability can easily appear attractive to an electorate that
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This Commentary follows on from a one-day conference on the future of Canada’s Inflation
Targets held at the C. D. Howe Institute on March 29, 2007, and was heavily influenced by its
deliberations. Nevertheless, it does not claim to be a conference summary, and those who
participated in the event are responsible neither for its contents nor its omissions. Charles
Freedman, the conference rapporteur, kindly provided the author with a written summary of its
proceedings, and also commented on an earlier draft of this paper, as did Robin Banerjee, John
Crow, Don Drummond, Paul Masson, Finn Poschmann, Bill Robson, Pierre Siklos and reviewers
at the Bank of Canada. None of these, however, is thereby implicated in the views expressed
here.has grown used to stability, and lost sight of the need to maintain the policy
regime that has delivered it. Witness, for example, the recent popularity of
arguments that the Bank of Canada should hold interest rates down in order to
protect exporters of manufactured products from an appreciating currency.
In any event, the inflation-targeting regime, introduced in 1991, has never been
subjected to a comprehensive review, so the Bank of Canada’s (2006) promise to
undertake one between now and 2011, and to encourage public participation in it,
is extremely welcome. This announcement, long enough in coming to warrant a
“better late than never” response, provides the raison d’etre for a new initiative on
Canadian monetary policy from the C. D. Howe Institute.
Issues to be Discussed
The Bank of Canada’s announcement proposes a wide-ranging agenda, dealing
with technical issues concerning the execution of policy, as well as with broader
matters of principle. Many of the former, important though they are, can be
addressed within the terms of the agreement currently in place between the Bank
and the minister of finance.
1 Not so the latter, however, and this Commentary
addresses two of the more pressing matters at hand. First, whether the target rate
of inflation should be lowered from 2 percent; and second, whether policymakers
should continue to treat past inflation performance, when it has under- or over-
shot their target, as a bygone in their deliberations on future policy, or should
rather attempt to cancel out its effects on price levels.
These two issues will be discussed here as a package because, though it would
be possible to make either change without the other, their joint implementation
would in effect shift Canada’s monetary order from a low inflation to a price-level
stability goal, a prospect that requires early analysis and debate if it really is in the
cards for 2011.
To begin with, smooth implementation of such a change will require the
ground to be prepared well in advance, but even more important at the current
juncture, the pros and cons have not yet received the systematic examination and
public discussion they require. That is why this Commentary identifies issues that
need further attention rather than making firm recommendations.
Specifically, the following questions will be raised below: whether the
achievement and maintenance of price stability would bring gains in economic
efficiency relative to the status quo; whether moving to it would entail significant
costs; whether even our current low inflation rate has effects on the distribution of
income and wealth that would be worth eliminating; whether developments
abroad, and particularly the US, might in any way narrow the scope of Canada’s
monetary policy choices; and whether, finally, there is any prospect of political
support for monetary change.
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1 Among these are: the extent to which the behaviour of markets for financial assets and housing
should be taken into special account in policy decisions; the time horizons for which and over
which policy decisions are made; the role of core inflation as an indicator variable, and even as a
potential alternative to CPI inflation as a policy goal; and the amount of information about its
own forecasts that the Bank should publish.As we shall see, the experience of the last 15 years has already generated
answers to some of these questions that are different from those we might have
expected in the early 1990s, even if some remain tentative, and not all point in the
same direction. Thus, low inflation proved more easily sustainable than was
widely believed when it became a policy target, and its achievement has done
much to promote improved economic performance. Even so, at least in the light of
experience to date, it is hard to argue that further efficiency gains to be had from a
move to price stability would be large enough to warrant incurring the costs of
achieving it. But distributional considerations — who loses and who gains from
inflation — could conceivably tip the balance in its favour. Along with
international considerations, they might also emerge as sources of political
support.
The View From 1991
Monetary policy was already controversial in Canada in 1991, but that year’s
implementation of an “inflation reduction program” was as much prompted by
the short-run problem of how to forestall a wage-price spiral threatened by the
impending introduction of the GST as by any longer term considerations.
2
Inflation Targeting Since 1991
The 1991 program set a gradual downward path for inflation, which was to reach
2 percent in 1995. It envisaged further progress thereafter towards “price stability,”
whose characteristics — apart from an inflation rate “clearly below” 2 percent —
were left unspecified pending further study. But in 1993, with the advent of a new
government and a new Bank of Canada governor, a decision about “price
stability” was deferred until 1998. And in 1998, what by then had become an
“inflation control target” of 2 percent  per annum (plus or minus 1 percentage
point) was renewed for a further three years. There have been two further
renewals of this 2 percent target since then, and along the way, the possibility of
aiming at price stability has simply disappeared.
3
It is hard to criticize the caution exercised in 1991, and the later reluctance to
rock the boat when things seemed to be working out reasonably well. In 1991, the
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2 The Bank of Canada had begun to propose “price stability” as a policy goal in 1988 (See John
Crow 1988), but had neither quantified it nor specified a timetable for achieving it, and the
Bank’s policies encountered serious credibility problems in international markets in early 1990.
The tone of the debate at that time is well exemplified in two C. D. Howe Institute publications,
Richard Lipsey, ed., (1990) and Robert York, ed., (1990). On the factors that prompted the
introduction of targets, see Charles Freedman (1994) and Crow (2002).
3 This is not to suggest that there have not been significant developments in the monetary policy
area since 1991. On the contrary, there have been many: the adoption of fixed decision dates for
setting the overnight rate target in 1999; experiments involving the Monetary Conditions Index in
the mid-1990s that tried, but ultimately failed, to find a significant and systematic place for the
exchange rate in the policy framework; analysis of the role of “core” inflation measures as guides
to policy; etc. However, these have all concerned the implementation of a policy whose basic
goals have remained essentially unchanged. Much of this material is discussed in Laidler and
Robson (2004).authorities were under pressure to “do something” to define their intentions for
monetary policy in a difficult environment. There was no recent experience of how
the economy was likely to behave in conditions of sustained low inflation, let
alone price stability. Moreover, Canada was only the second country (after New
Zealand) to adopt inflation targets in 1991. Sixteen years later, we know a great
deal more about how low inflation economies work, not just from local experience,
but from international evidence too, because no fewer than 24 countries,
amounting to about a quarter of the world economy, now have such programs in
place (see Andrew Rose 2006). Furthermore, if those arguing for the adoption of
formal inflation targets in the US have their way, the international environment
will be changed even more.
All of these factors add to the case for a thorough review of the basics of
Canada’s monetary policy regime. This is not to prejudge matters by saying that
the status quo is seriously defective. However, a comparison of the regime’s
characteristics with some state-of-the-art benchmark is long overdue, and some
thought also needs to be given to how it fits into a changing international
environment.
Efficiency and Price Stability
Peter Howitt’s masterly (1990) survey of the effects of inflation on economic
efficiency retains its relevance today. Inflation inhibits the smooth workings of
market mechanisms by making the signals emanating from individual price
changes harder to read, and making the planning of consumption and production
more error prone. It also distorts accounting standards, developed on the
assumption of price stability, and tax systems built upon them. These effects differ
in their intensity across activities and hence further undermine the economy’s
ability to allocate resources efficiently. Inflation’s rapidity intensifies such
problems, moreover, because its variability increases as it rises, causing time
horizons in capital markets to shorten and making long-term investments more
difficult to plan and finance. These efficiency effects vanish only when the price
level is stable, which is surely one reason why, in 1991, the 2 percent target was
presented as only an interim goal.
4
Policymakers did not spell out just what price stability would look like in 1991.
But on the reasonable assumption that the Consumer Price Index (CPI) was to
remain the relevant measure of the price level, Laidler and Robson (1993, Ch. 11)
speculated that pursuing stability would likely have to mean targeting a rise of 1
percent instead of 2 percent  per annum. Such a goal, then as now, allows for the
fact that the CPI provides a slightly upward-biased measure of changes in the true
“cost of living.” It also provides all- important policy clarity, based on the pursuit
of a “round number” inflation rate for a widely understood cost-of-living measure.
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4 It should be noted that academic literature dating back to the inter-war years identifies certain
potential gains from mild deflation. George Selgin (1997) discusses these ideas, which however
do not at present command wide support among either academics or policymakers and will not
be discussed further here. However, a full review of Canada's monetary policy goals would pay
some attention to them.As well, they suggested that price stability might involve aiming at the time path
of this price index itself rather than its inflation rate.
5
Perhaps it is not surprising that this goal attracted little support at the time,
when even 2 percent inflation seemed over-ambitious to many commentators.
Though this inflation rate was quickly reached in the wake of the 1990-91
recession, it was uncontroversial, even among the new policy’s supporters, that
keeping it there would very likely be at the cost of at least slowing down
temporarily the then-incipient recovery. Since any incremental long-term benefits
of lowering inflation further were expected to be small, 2 percent inflation must
have seemed like a reasonable place to stop, at least for a while.
6 There was also a
danger, in the view of policymakers, that, as the economy recovered from
recession, even this target might be overshot quite often, and as a corollary, that a
policy based on a time path for the price level would imply a commitment to drive
inflation significantly below 2 percent with some frequency to compensate for
such errors. Given then-prevailing doubts about the feasibility of doing this at any
reasonable cost, it was easy to defend letting bygones be bygones in the wake of
such overshoots.
Today’s Perspective
Our current regime is thus much more the legacy of compromises, made in the
early 1990s by cautious politicians and central bankers, than the outcome of
careful calculations about what the optimal goal of monetary policy should
actually be. The 2 percent target is now firmly embedded, however, despite the
fact that 2 percent inflation has been so clearly sustainable that it is now hard to
believe that something lower is not also within reach. And this fact also suggests
that doubts were also exaggerated about the costs involved in creating shorter
bouts of even lower inflation, which counted against targeting a time path for the
price level in 1991.
Some Pros and Cons of Price Stability 
We now understand, as we then did not, that a price-level target has potentially
important short-term advantages. If and when, as a result of some shock to the
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5 As noted above, an inflation target allows bygones to be bygones when it is missed, and thus has
the potential to introduce drift into the price level's time path. Hence, it preserves an element of
expectational uncertainty that makes long-term saving and investment decisions more difficult, a
problem that is eliminated by targeting the time path of the price level itself. A reading of John
Crow (2002) suggests that it was “price stability” of the sort just discussed that he had in mind as
the ultimate aim when, as governor of the Bank of Canada, he first began to use the phrase
systematically (see Crow 1988). The term resurfaced in 1991 to characterize the inflation
reduction program's post-1995 goal.
6 And this is not to mention the work of Akerlof, Dickens and Perry (1996), which suggested that
the existence of downward money-wage stickiness, over and above anything that could be
attributed to expectation effects, might also make it wise to aim for a noticeably positive inflation
rate in any economy. For discussion of these issues in a specifically Canadian context, see the
contributions of Howitt, Fortin and Parkin in Laidler, ed. (1997). A recent, general discussion of
these issues, is to be found in Francesco Giavazzi and Frederic Mishkin (2006).financial system, there is a threat of falling prices, such an arrangement requires
not only that policy react to prevent this, but that it becomes sufficiently
expansionary to induce enough temporary inflation to get the price level itself
back on track. Such expansion, which would not be called for under inflation
targeting, and anticipations of it among the general public in particular, would
provide a much-needed antidote to the real stagnation that many fear can be
created in such circumstances. In such an event, conventional monetary policy
responses are also limited by the fact that interest rates cannot be reduced below
zero. The probability of encountering such eventualities obviously rises as the long
run goal for inflation falls, which makes price-level targeting attractive as a
component of any policy package that would see Canada’s current 2 percent target
inflation rate cut to 1 percent.
7
Even so, not everything we have learned since 1991 favours the case for a
price-stability goal. Granted, as Laidler and Robson (2004) documented, most of
the specific benefits that were supposed to flow from lower inflation were
subsequently realized — easier decision making for consumers and firms, more
cordial labour relations, a restoration of activity in the long end of the capital
market, and so on. But the apparent effects of these gains on the overall level and
rate of growth of Canada’s productivity were disappointing. Things did look up
on the productivity front from the early 1990s onwards, but once the effects of the
FTA (and later the NAFTA), not to mention of the replacement of the
Manufacturers’ Sales Tax by the GST, are allowed for, there seems to be precious
little left over to attribute to lower inflation.
This evidence should surely be carefully re-examined as part of any review of
Canada’s monetary policy regime. But, as things currently stand, it would seem
that, if there were few productivity gains as inflation fell from the 4-to-5 per cent
range to a highly credible 2 percent, little is to be expected from a further one
percentage point reduction. Furthermore, though in principle price-level targeting
makes the time path of that variable more certain at longer horizons, and hence
reduces the risks attendant on long-term saving and investment decisions, it is not
clear that this consideration has been important in practice. Since 1995, though the
price level has swung around a 2 percent rising time path, there has been no
tendency for it to drift systematically away from it over time, and the inflation rate
has averaged almost exactly 2 percent per annum. Furthermore, the long end of
the capital market has become well re-established under the current regime, and
interest rates show no sign that savers are demanding significant premiums to
lend at terms of even 10 years or longer.
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7 The lower the target inflation rate, the greater is the danger of a policy undershoot generating
actual deflation, which many believe creates particularly difficult circumstances for monetary
policymakers. Lars Svensson (1999) provides a particularly compelling analysis of the beneficial
effects of price-level targeting, which include the possibility of generating, under some
circumstances, less variability in inflation for a given amount of variability in real output.
Svensson's results, however, are heavily dependent on the assumption that the public forms its
expectations in a “forward-looking” way, using a sophisticated understanding of how the policy
regime works. Forward-looking expectations are discussed further, below.
8 Nevertheless, the relevant evidence needs further examination before firm conclusions about
future policy are drawn, because what we are describing here are ex post outcomes for price-level
and interest-rate behaviour, rather than ex ante expectations about them, which might have been
rendered more secure by having a price-level targeting regime in place. Giavazzi and Mishkin ....The Costs of Reducing Inflation
Economic life with a 2 percent inflation target is surely easier than it was when
inflation was running at about 4 to 5 percent and no-one was sure where it would
go next. It is hard to believe that the much greater real economic stability
experienced since 1991 — a period in which the economy has seen no recession —
has not had a lot to do with the new regime as well. There is no economic case for
relaxing the 2 percent target, therefore, let alone abandoning it. But with no signs
of significant efficiency gains there for the taking, an important part of any
economic case for lowering it further is missing. This is a particularly telling point
if the costs of doing so might be significant.
It is a well-understood theoretical possibility that, if agents act on the basis of
“forward looking” expectations — if they understand the intentions of those
making monetary policy and use this understanding as a basis for acting in
anticipation of its consequences — a credibly pre-announced tightening of
monetary policy will have fewer disruptive side effects on output and
employment. Such analysis underpinned the hopes of a few, even in the early
1990s, that disinflation might be achieved with relatively mild transitional costs
once the inflation reduction policy was announced.
There is, however, no good reason to believe that either the 1991
announcement or the renewal of the program in 1993 had any such effects.
Instead, some evidence, notably the fact that longer term nominal interest rates
did not fall significantly until the mid-90s, suggests that they did not. It was thus
only after targets had been regularly and visibly hit (or undershot) for a few years
that private sector expectations seem to have adjusted and become consistent with
the goals of monetary policy. This is not surprising. By 1991, policymakers had
been announcing their good intentions for two decades without delivering, so
evidence was needed that promises were at last being kept before they were likely
to be believed. But further questions about the nature of the credibility that was
established in the 1990s remain, and are relevant both to the likely costs of further
inflation reduction, and of adopting price-level targeting too.
What Agents Have Learned Since 1991
At one extreme, it may be that individuals and businesses have learned since 1991
that policymakers can be counted on to keep their promises. If credibility of this
sort has indeed now been established, then this would amount to saying that
expectations have now become “forward looking.” This, in turn, would hold out
some hope that a future pre-announcement of a change in the configuration of the
monetary policy regime could influence behaviour in anticipation of its
implementation, thus facilitating a smooth transition. And, as already noted
above, such forward-looking expectations would also enhance the short-run
stabilizing properties of price-level targeting, particularly perhaps at very low
inflation rates.
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footnote 8 cont’d
(2006) provide a thorough review of the pros and cons of price-level targeting.At the other extreme, however, perhaps nothing more has happened than that
agents, experiencing a 2 percent inflation environment, have eventually adapted
their behaviour to it without making any conscious effort to understand matters
further. If this is so, then expectations remain “backward looking,” and any future
effort to implement a new regime — even if it is pre-announced — will risk
creating inconsistency between the goals of policy and private sector expectations
about its outcome. This inconsistency, in turn, will disrupt the economy’s smooth
working until those expectations once more catch up with experience.
Nowadays, forward-looking behaviour does seem to characterize financial
markets, which would probably take a carefully pre-announced change in the
rules of the monetary policy game in their stride.
9 The likely reaction in labour
and goods markets however, at least as important to the costs of any such change,
is more difficult to predict. These markets have certainly shown more flexibility in
Canada since the early 1990s, with symptoms of the kind of extrapolative
behaviour associated with backward-looking expectations diminishing in
importance. There now seems to be less stickiness in money wages and prices than
there was, and less inertia in their time paths, while the degree of “pass through”
into the domestic prices of imported goods as their foreign prices and the
exchange rate vary has also been markedly reduced.
10 More generally, the
Canadian labour market has displayed remarkable resilience in the face of very
large shocks emanating from fluctuations in world commodity prices that were
not completely buffered by offsetting exchange rate swings.
Even so, though wage and price flexibility have markedly increased, both are
probably still less than complete. As well, the labour market’s resilience has
delivered changes in wage relativities among sectors and regions against an overall
stable upward trend in money wages, so we still cannot be sure about its capacity
to absorb the generalized downward pressure on that trend that a move to lower
inflation would imply. Furthermore, there has been a lengthening of the periods of
wage settlements and a reduction in the frequency of Cost of Living Allowance
(COLA) clauses (Laidler and Robson 2004). These settlements surely reflect greater
confidence in the stability of the current inflation rate, and by their very nature
constitute a new obstacle to changing that rate, particularly at short notice.
Distributive Issues
If the trade-off between the efficiency benefits to be expected from setting a price-
stability goal for monetary policy and the costs of making the transition to it is
considered in isolation, the evidence, as it now stands, seems to favour sticking
with the status quo. The distributional effects of inflation perhaps point in a
8 C.D. Howe Institute Commentary
9 For example, the lack of interest in monetary policy noted at the outset of this Commentary does
not extend to the media that serve this sector, where the attention paid the latest economic
indicators, and their likely implications for the Bank of Canada’s next interest rate decision, is not
only essentially continuous but also displays a widespread understanding that the decision in
question will be aimed at keeping inflation on track.
10 Among relevant studies of the evidence discussed here are Amirault, Kwan and Wilkinson
(2006), and Bouakez and Rebei (2005).different direction, however, and along with international considerations, might
also be the source of political pressures for change.
Inflation and the Purchasing Power of Savings
Inflation’s corrosive effect on nominal savings, and on fixed-money incomes is
notorious. Even the current target rate of 2 percent will reduce the purchasing
power of a dollar to less than 80 cents in a decade. But the weight that we might
attach to this effect depends on, among other things, just how many people are
vulnerable to it, and who they are.
11 Here it is crucial to note how much
demographics have changed since the early 1990s. The baby boom generation is
aging, so the number of older people whose wealth and incomes are likely to be
adversely affected by inflation is growing rapidly.
Their pensions, of course, can be indexed, and some are and will be, not least
the government-provided elements of the system (C/QPP and OAS — GIS).
However, except in the public sector, indexation is not a common feature of the
supplementary occupational pension plans and annuitized RRSPs, on which many
rely to top up these basic benefits. Moreover, as private-sector plans continue to
shift away from the defined-benefit and towards the defined-contribution model
— a trend that started in the 1990s — the extent of such indexation is likely to
decline further.
Some Effects of Taxation
There is little comfort to be found in the well-known tendency of nominal interest
rates to include a premium that helps to offset the effects of inflation on savings.
This premium is always a rough and ready source of compensation, and
sometimes incomplete. But crucially, it interacts in unfortunate ways with a
Canadian tax code that treats the whole of the nominal return on any asset (even
on an index-linked government bond) as taxable income. This interaction is
particularly troublesome when real interest rates themselves are low, as they are at
present.
The arithmetic here can be sobering, even for savers with rather modest
incomes. For example, at the currently targeted 2 percent inflation rate, anyone in
a 25 percent marginal tax bracket who wants a mere 2 percent after-tax real rate of
return would have to hold an asset yielding a before-tax nominal return of just
over 5.3 per cent — far above anything currently available on safe instruments in
Canada. At 1 percent inflation, a 4 percent yield would suffice. Or, to put the same
point another way, if an investor gets a before-tax nominal rate of return of 3.6
percent on a GIC, the after-tax real return is 0.7 per cent when the inflation rate is
at 2 per cent, and 1.7 per cent when it is 1 per cent. Should inflation stray to its
current 3 percent upper boundary for a whole tax year, real after-tax returns over
that interval would be negative on these same assumptions.
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11 The reader is reminded that there are gainers as well as losers from the redistributive effects of
inflation, including governments (and hence taxpayers in general), shareholders in financial
institutions and borrowers in general, including younger home-owners with mortgages.Now it is not clear how long the low levels of real interest rates currently
prevailing are likely to persist, but the longer they do the more widely will
Canadian savers recognize the effects of even 2 percent inflation on after-tax real
returns. The disheartening effect will be deepened by the baleful influence of
inflation on the purchasing power of the supplementary pension incomes of a
growing fraction of the population. These distributional consequences, arguably
undesirable, are thus likely to become more widespread in the next few years, and
a constituency with little tolerance for even low inflation might well develop as a
result. In order to assess the gains to be expected from moving to a price-stability
goal, and the extent of the political support it might command, it would be worth
knowing just how many people are likely to be affected by these developments,
and to what extent.
International Factors
Any country that sets a purely domestic goal for its monetary policy must allow
its exchange rate to float more or less freely, and there is no technical economic
reason why the international inflationary environment should impinge on
Canada’s domestic monetary policy choices. Nowadays the 2 percent inflation rate
that seemed so ambitious in 1991 is unremarkable among the world’s economies:
no fewer than 27 of the 42 countries listed in the Economist’s “league tables” of
economic performance had consumer price inflation rates of 3 percent or less last
year. As well, any effects of a move to a price-stability target on the day-to-day
behaviour of the Canadian dollar’s exchange rate would surely be swamped by
the influence of other factors. These features of the international environment are
therefore neutral when it comes to a choice between price stability and the status
quo.
Overseas Experience
Some recent overseas experience can nevertheless be read as suggesting that
inflation targets can be set too low for comfort. New Zealand, for example, began
with a target inflation range of 0 to 2 percent but has now completed the process
of revising it upwards to 1 to 3 percent. Britain has also slightly raised its target,
though stealthily.
12 Recently, too, Sweden has been advised by outside experts
(Giavazzi and Mishkin 2006) to relax its policy a little to reduce the frequency with
which it has undershot its inflation target in recent years. To the extent that it
might be desirable for targeters to converge upon a common goal in the interests
of international financial stability — and Andrew Rose (2006) has recently
suggested that inflation targeting has now become so widespread that we should
think of it as a newly emerging international monetary system — perhaps Canada
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12 Unlike Canada, New Zealand policymakers attach no particular significance to the mid-point of
the range. Britain has relaxed its targets by dropping the price index initially targeted — the UK
retail price index — substituting for it the so-called “harmonized consumer price index” used in
the euro zone, while lowering its actual inflation target from 2.5 to 2 percent, which is probably
less than would have been needed to compensate for the greater tendency of the latter to overstate
inflation.already has things about right. And significantly in this respect also, no country
currently targets the time path of its price level.
The Future of US Policy
The international considerations that are likely to impinge most on Canada’s
monetary policy choices arise from its close economic ties to the US, which is now
having a rather low-key debate about whether or not to follow the international
crowd and adopt formal inflation targets of its own. As we saw in the late 1990s,
Canadians have a low political tolerance for a currency that systematically
declines against the US dollar. So were the US to move onto a lower inflation path
than Canada and hence make a long-term Canadian dollar depreciation a
possibility, this would work against local political support for the status quo and
make a move to price stability (or at least to a lower inflation target) more
attractive.
Such a contingency perhaps seems remote at present. The US is still some way
from adopting formal inflation targets, and domestic considerations there would
surely loom large in the design of any scheme likely to be proposed for serious
consideration, let alone adopted. Since there does not seem to be much interest in
reducing the long-run inflation rate among the US electorate at present, such a
regime would likely be built around a target inflation rate at the top end of the
Federal Reserve system’s current “comfort zone,” which, if anything, seems to
involve a higher rate than that currently targeted in Canada.
13 However, the likely
effects of introducing a formal target on the status of the US dollar as an
international reserve currency — a consideration with no parallel in the Canadian
policy environment — could not be quite ignored, so decisions already made
elsewhere in the world would have to count for something. Perhaps significantly
in this context, the US dollar’s main competitor as a reserve currency, the Euro, is
already subject to a monetary policy goal of inflation “below, but close to 2
percent.” 
So, if, in the light of current domestic political considerations, an inflation-
targeting US would be unlikely to opt for an inflation rate much less than it has
recently been informally pursuing, it would surely not be likely to opt for
anything much higher than 2 percent either, because of international
considerations. Furthermore, the same demographic forces discussed above in the
Canadian context are also at work in the US, so domestic political preferences
there might also change in due course. In the longer run, then, the adoption of
more ambitious inflation targets in the US than those currently in place in Canada
cannot be quite discounted, and there might be something to be said for staying
ahead of such developments if that would make it easier to maintain public
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13 The Federal Reserve seems to pay particular attention to the rate of change of the “core personal
consumption expenditure deflator.” However, this particular inflation measure has recently run
close to a percentage point below the rate of change of the US consumer price index, the
equivalent index to that targeted by the Bank of Canada. A recent study by Daniel Thornton
(2007) suggests that the Fed. has an implicit objective for the long-run inflation rate that would
keep it within a range of 1 to 3.3 percent, with a mid-point of 2.25 percent.support for the local regime in the longer run. This consideration needs further
analysis, with a view to being factored into Canada’s 2011 decision.
Concluding Comment
“Further work is required” is an old academic cliché, and it certainly applies in
this case. Though it is hard to argue for shifting to a price-stability goal on the
traditional grounds that this would promote economic efficiency, at least given
currently available evidence on these matters, we have seen that distributional and
international factors might, in the next few years, not only tend to favour such a
change, but also generate political support for making it. It would, therefore, be
wise to invest some effort in looking at these more carefully and assessing the
likelihood of such an outcome.
It would also be worth re-examining what Canadians think we already know
about the above-mentioned efficiency considerations, and also to try, well in
advance of any decision, to understand better what the costs of change might be,
and of how these might be reduced. We need to investigate why elements of
backward-looking expectations, and of the extrapolative behaviour that goes with
them, seem to persist. Further we should consider whether any problems these
might create can be mitigated by increasing the public’s understanding of how
monetary policy works, by enhancing the credibility of any promises that are
made about its future, and by making such promises well in advance of any
change.
But whether the eventual decision is to shift to a price-stability goal or to
remain with the 2 percent inflation status quo, a systematic and public airing of
the issues at stake in the design of the post-2011 monetary policy framework well
in advance of that decision will be thoroughly worthwhile. It will ensure that the
configuration of this central element of Canada’s monetary order will have been
self-consciously chosen on its merits, rather than improvised by default yet again.
This will indeed be better late than never for a regime that in 2011 will already be
20 years old.
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